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Lindsay P. Ward 
 
 In addition to stocking grocery stores and restaurants with beef, chicken 
and milk, CAFOs generate another product—manure. The EPA’s decision to 
withdraw a proposed rule compelling CAFOs to provide information to aid the 
agency in regulating their discharge of pollutants into the waters of the United 
States was upheld by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
The court concluded that the EPA’s decision was “adequately explained” and 
“coherent,” supported by the administrative record, and did not conflict with 
existing law.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Environmental Integrity Project v. McCarthy addressed the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) decision to withdraw a proposed 
rule requiring concentrated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”)1 to provide the 
agency with information that would assist the agency in regulating pollutants 
discharged into United States waters under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).2 Five 
non-profit organizations (“Plaintiffs”) asserted that the EPA’s decision to 
withdraw the proposed rule after the notice and comment period was “arbitrary 
and capricious,” as the evidence contradicted the agency’s conclusion violating 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).3 After finding Plaintiffs had standing, 
the court reviewed the agency decision under the APA and concluded that the 
EPA’s withdrawal was “adequately explained.”4 Next, the court evaluated the 
EPA’s decision in light of the administrative record.5 The Plaintiffs’ final claim 
that the withdrawal conflicted with the EPA’s mandate under the CWA was 
dismissed as a misunderstanding of responsibilities imposed by the CWA.  
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Enacted to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters,” the CWA seeks to safeguard a valuable 
                                                        
1  CAFOs are defined primarily as an animal feeding operation (“AFO”), an 
operation that holds animals for forty-five days or more within a twelve-month period. 40 
C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1). CAFO is an AFO that is either medium or large in quantity of animals 
in the facility or is “a significant contributor of pollutants to waters of the United States.”  Id. 
§§ 122.23(b)(2), (c). 
2  Envtl. Integrity Project v. McCarthy, No. 13-1306 (RDM), ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2015). 
3  Id. at *2-3. 
4  Id. at *31, *38. 
5  Id. 
  
 
2 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
 
resource. 6  “The discharge of any pollutant” is forbidden. 7  This definition 
encompasses “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source.” 8  Point sources include “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to . . . concentrated animal feeding 
operation[s].”9 A cornerstone of the CWA is the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”), which was created in part to solve the failings 
of previous federal water pollution laws. This program prohibits discharge unless 
the point source, such as a CAFO, has received a permit.10 NPDES permits are 
issued either by the EPA or by state agencies under the EPA’s delegated 
authority.11  
CAFOs have been subject to regulation by the EPA for years; these 
industrial farms are major water polluters and have a detrimental effect on both 
human health and the environment.12 In 2003, the EPA conducted a study that 
found that animals raised in CAFOs produce over three times the “amount of raw 
waste” that all the humans in the United States produce, and approximately sixty 
percent of all manure produced by farms confining animals.13  Environmental 
damage caused by CAFOs pollutants includes algal blooms, which are 
responsible for killing fish and producing dead zones.14 There are over forty 
diseases found in manure that can infect humans; this fecal matter often contains 
“heavy meals, as well as antibiotics, growth hormones, and pharmaceutical 
agents administered to livestock.”15 Notwithstanding these effects, and decades 
of regulation under the NPDES program, the EPA does not have a 
“comprehensive understanding of the number, location, and permitting status of 
[CAFOs] in the United States.”16 
Motivated by these concerns, the EPA promulgated a rule in 2003 that 
created a “mandatory duty for all CAFOs to apply for a NPDES permit.”17 This 
rule was struck down by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which concluded the EPA had overstepped its authority by compelling 
all CAFOs to obtain permits.18 The court determined that the EPA could not 
require CAFOs that did not discharge pollutants to undergo this process.19 The 
                                                        
6  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
7  33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012).  
8  33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012). 
9  Id. § 1362(14). 
10  Id. § 1342. 
11  Id. § 1251(b). 
12  Envtl. Integrity Project, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653, at *3. 
13  Id. (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations Reporting Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 65431, 65431 (Oct. 21, 2011)). 
14  Id. (citing 76 Fed. Reg. at 65432.) 
15  Id. (citing 76 Fed. Reg. at 65434.) 
16  Id. at *4 
17  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and 
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 
68 Fed. Reg. 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003).    
18  Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 489, 504 (2d. Cir. 2005) 
19  Id. at 524.  
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EPA proposed a second rule, allowing CAFOs to voluntarily state that they did 
not anticipate or currently discharge pollutants and thereby could bypass the 
permitting process.20 Vacated again by the court the EPA stated in the settlement 
agreement that it would propose a rule “that would require CAFOs to provide 
certain information.”21 Under § 308 of the CWA, the EPA is given expansive 
power to discover information to achieve the purpose of the CWA.22 Section 308 
permits the EPA to set forth rules compelling a point source to “submit 
information to the EPA or by surveying point sources without formal rule-
making.”23 
Following the settlement agreement, the EPA proposed two rules in 
October 2011.24 The rule relevant to the instant case was labeled the “Information 
Rule,” and would require all CAFOs to submit to the EPA “contact information, 
location of the CAFO’s production area, NPDES permitting status, number, and 
type of animals, and number of acres available for land application.”25 The EPA 
also set out three “alternative approaches.”26 The EPA eventually adopted the 
first alterative. 27  Under this approach, the EPA would examine current data 
sources including the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), state 
NPDES permitting programs, and satellite imagery to gather information 
necessary to properly permit CAFOs.28 On July 20, 2012, the EPA took final 
agency action and withdrew the Information Rule, determining it would utilize 
the first alternative and “collect CAFO information using existing sources of 
information.”29 
III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Plaintiffs challenged the EPA’s decision to withdraw the Information 
Rule in the D.C. District Court.30 The Plaintiffs alleged that the EPA’s decision 
was “arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA,” as it “lacks clear 
reasoning, runs counter to the evidence in the administrative record, and 
constitutes a clear error in judgment.” 31  The district court denied Plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
                                                        
20  Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation 
and Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in Response 
to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 70418, 70426 (Nov. 20, 2008).  
21  76 Fed. Reg. at 65435. 
22  33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (2012). 
23  Envtl. Integrity Project, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653, at *9. 
24  Id. at *4.  
25  76 Fed. Reg. at 65436. 
26  Id. at 65445. 
27  Envtl. Integrity Project, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653, at *15. 
28  Id. at *16-18. 
29  77 Fed. Reg. at 42679. 
30  Envtl. Integrity Project, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653, at *1. 
31  Id. at *2-3. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
 The standard of review applied to the EPA’s decision to withdraw a 
proposed rule falls under the APA.32 The EPA’s decision is given more deference 
than “a decision to promulgate a new rule or to rescind an existing one.”33 The 
court will vacate the EPA’s decision if it examined factors Congress did not 
intend to have weighed, if its decision relied on evidence that conflicts with the 
evidence presented, or ventures into the realm of improbability.34 An agency is 
permitted to withdraw a proposed rule as long as the decision is the result of 
“reasoned decisionmaking.”35  
 
A. Was the EPA’s Withdrawal “Adequately Explained?” 
 
The court first addressed whether the EPA’s “path may reasonably be 
discerned” and the decision sufficiently justified.36 The EPA determined that the 
existing information approach would garner “much of the desired CAFO 
information.” 37  In withdrawing the rule, the EPA stated it could redistribute 
resources that would have been used to promulgate the rule to instead examine 
current information and discover CAFOs lacking permit coverage.38 Additionally, 
the EPA would work in conjunction with state and federal agencies to collect 
information; a collaboration that would likely be fruitful as these agencies have 
existing relationships with CAFOs.39 Finding that “[l]imited Agency recourses 
warrant a targeted approach that will result in the greatest impact on water 
quality” and the method chosen by the EPA would likely produce some of the 
information sought, the court concluded that the EPA “adequately explained” its 
rationale.40 
 
B. Does the Administrative Record Affirm the EPA’s Withdrawal? 
 
Plaintiffs asserted that the EPA’s contention that existing sources would 
provide much of the required CAFO information lacked a foundation in the 
                                                        
32  Williams Nat’l Gas Co. v. FERC, 872 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989)  
33  Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 
43 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  
34  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983).  
35  Williams Nat. Gas Co., 872 F.2d at 444.  
36  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight 
Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). 
37  77 Fed. Reg. at 42681. 
38  Envtl. Integrity Project, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653, at *34. 
39  77 Fed. Reg. 42681. 
40  Envtl. Integrity Project, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653, at *37 (citing Joint 
Appendix at 37, Envtl. Integrity Project v. McCarthy, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 29, 2015) (No. 13-1306 (RDM)). 
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administrative record.41 Examining both permitted and unpermitted CAFOs, the 
district court held that there was ample supporting evidence in the record.42 The 
EPA administers NPDES programs for four states and, consequently, already 
possesses the information the proposed Information Rule sought to gather.43 The 
EPA concluded that the remaining NPDES self-regulated forty-six states would 
offer the information, finding “it can obtain much of the desired CAFO 
information” from this existing source.44 The court agreed with Plaintiffs that 
unpermitted CAFOs were the most challenging category, stating “that the record 
reveals significant obstacles to using existing data sources to compile a 
comprehensive database.” 45  However, the court determined that the record 
supported the EPA’s declaration that it could find some information on 
unpermitted CAFOs.46  
The court dismissed Plaintiff’s argument that alternatives existed, stating 
that it declined to “second-guess the [EPA’s] policy judgments about which tools 
are most likely to work.”47 The court further found that the record supported the 
EPA’s contention that the withdrawal of the Information Rule was a “reasonable 
next step towards a more complete solution.”48 While Plaintiffs stated that the 
EPA failed to fully express how withdrawing the rule was a permissible step 
towards the final goal of a complete informational archive, the court found the 
EPA did delineate its objective and the methods that would be used.49 The court 
acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ final argument that the Informational Rule would 
not have been too demanding was likely accurate.50 While the EPA estimated that 
it would only take an hour to find and enter the required information by the 
CAFOs, the court stated, “no approach is free of substantial burdens” related to 
effectiveness and “resource allocation.”51 
 
C.  Is the Withdrawal Contrary to Law? 
 
Plaintiffs’ last claim was that the final decision contradicted the EPA’s 
mandate under the CWA to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”52 The court dismissed this claim as 
overbroad, noting that prior decisions did not advocate all agency action to “be 
measured against the relevant statutes that the agency enforces.” 53  The court 
                                                        
41  Id. at *38. 
42  Id. at *46-47. 
43  Id. at *40 
44  Id. at *39. 
45  Id. at *43. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. at *48. 
48  Id. at *49-50. 
49  Id. at *51. 
50  Id. at *53. 
51  Id. at *54, 52. 
52  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); see Envtl. Integrity Project, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
131653, at *55-56. 
53  Envtl. Integrity Project, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653, at *56. 
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determined that there was no requirement that all CAFOs “self-report,” and the 
statute gave the EPA the authority to select the information it deemed it might 
rationally need.54 Deferring to the EPA, the district court declined to impose its 
findings in place of the agency’s judgment.55 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Under the directives of the CWA, the EPA is given broad authority to 
require information it finds necessary under § 308. While this case may 
underscore deference by the courts to agency action, the decision will likely be 
appealed. Should an appeal be heard, it is probable the EPA will have to offer up 
additional evidence to show that its decision was “adequately explained,” 
especially given that the burden on CAFOs to comply with the withdrawal rule 
was admittedly light. 56  The manure discharged by CAFOs causes significant 
environmental and health hazards; the decision’s greatest flaw may be the 
conclusion that the EPA could adequately and efficiently acquire the needed 
information to regulate CAFOs by solely relying on existing information, which 
may or may not be readily available.  
                                                        
54  33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A). 
55  Envtl. Integrity Project, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131653, at *57-58. 
56  Id. at *54. 
